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MAKING FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION LAWS ACTUALLY WORK:
THE CASE OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Mary M. Cheh*
Although FOIA requests were filed with the city in May 2000, District officials didn't provide documents for months, and then every filing deadline
was missed and documents trickled out very slowly. In the first submission
of documents, the city's corporation counsel deleted the names of social
workers, police officers and other workers who should have been held accountable. Even in the second submission, some data were withheld. If the
District worked as hard to protect children as to protect its bureaucracy,
perhaps more of the children who died would be alive today.'
INTRODUCTION

In 1966, when signing the Freedom of Information Act, Lyndon Johnson asserted that "[n]o one should be able to pull curtains of secrecy around decisions
which can be revealed without injury to the public interest.",2 Since that day, the
federal Freedom of Information Act has been a staple of modern American government. Indeed, every state in the United States now has a public-record disclosure law.
Though these laws have long been the subject of debate, government transparency has recently received a significant amount of attention. In his first week
of office, President Barack Obama issued a memorandum to all federal agencies
in which he declared that "the Freedom of Information Act should be adminis''3
tered with a clear presumption: In the face of doubt, openness prevails. This
simple action signaled to many the beginning of a new era in federal transparency. Following this directive, Attorney General Eric Holder circulated a
memorandum in which he "strongly encourage[d] agencies to make discretionary
disclosures of information.",4 The Holder memorandum went on to state that "the
* Professor Mary M. Cheh, Elyce Zenoff Research Professor of Law, George Washington University, and Councilmember for Ward 3, Council of the District of Columbia. Many thanks to my
Chief of Staff, V. David Zvenyach, who provided invaluable assistance in the preparation of this
article.
1 Editorial, Cloaking Deaths in Secrecy, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 2001, at A24.
2 President Lyndon B. Johnson, Statement upon signing the Freedom of Information Act of
1966 (Jul. 4, 1966).
3 Exec. Order No. 13489, 74 Fed. Reg. 4669 (Jan. 26, 2009).
4 Memorandum from U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies regarding the Freedom of Information Act (Mar. 19, 2009), available at http://
www.justice.gov/ag/foia-memo-march2009.pdf.
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Department of Justice will defend a denial of a FOIA request only if (1) the
agency reasonably foresees that disclosure would harm an interest protected by
one of the statutory exemptions, or (2) disclosure is prohibited by law." 5 In furthering Obama's new openness, Peter Orszag, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, in December 2009 issued an "Open Government
Directive," in which he directed agencies to take "specific actions to implement
6
the principles of transparency, participation, and collaboration.",
There has been a dramatic move toward openness elsewhere as well. In 2007,
Congress responded to perceptions of secrecy in the federal government by passing the "Openness Promotes Effectiveness in our National (OPEN) Government
Act."' 7 The next year, as part of what was described as a "quantum leap forward," 8 the Pennsylvania legislature substantially revised the Commonwealth's
Right to Know Law, 9 which was regarded as "one of the weakest in the country." 1 ° In 2009, Illinois reworked its "notoriously weak [and] poorly enforced"
Freedom of Information Act,1 1 leading its Attorney General to proclaim that the
law took Illinois "out of the Stone Age and into the modern era of transparency
12
and openness.,
Here in the nation's capital, though, the District's Freedom of Information Act
has essentially remained dormant, unexamined for almost a decade. This article
argues that the District should revisit its Freedom of Information Act and enact
legislation to enhance the enforcement of the law. The first part of the article
describes the basic framework of the federal and District Freedom of Information
Acts, including the structure, legislative history, and the practical implementation
experience of the District Freedom of Information Act. The second part sets out
the difficulties the District currently faces with FOIA compliance. The article
5 Id. This marked a radical departure from the infamous memorandum by then-Attorney General John Ashcroft, which stated that: "[wihen you carefully consider FOIA requests and decide to
withhold records, in whole or in part, you can be assured that the Department of Justice will defend
your decisions." John Ashcroft, Memorandum for Heads of All Federal Departments and Agencies
regarding the Freedom of Information Act (Oct. 12, 2001).
6 Memorandum from Peter Orszag, Dir., Off. of Mgmt. and Budget, to Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies regarding the Open Government Directive (Dec. 8, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/open/documents/open-government-directive.
7 Pub. L. No. 110-175, 121 Stat. 2524.
8

Open Records; A Victory for Pennsylvania, THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Feb. 14, 2008, at

A22 (quoting Pennsylvania Senate Majority Leader Dominic Pileggi).
9 65 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 67.101-.3104 (2008)
10 Id. See also Tom Barnes, House May Vote Today on Open Records, PIrrrSBUROH POST-GAZE-r-rE, Dec. 11, 2007, at B4.

11 Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan quoted in Press Release, Off. of the Illinois Governor, Governor Quinn Signs Major Legislation to Increase Transparency in State Government (Aug.
17, 2009), available at http:/lwww.illinois.govlPressReleases/ShowPressRelease.cfm?SubjectlD=3&
RecNum=7760.
12 Scared of the Sunshine, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 5, 2009, available at http://www.chicagotribune.com/
news/watchdog/chi-090405-edit,0,4816172.story.
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next explores other jurisdictions' approaches to freedom of information laws, and
compares their utility against the unique features of the District's government.
Finally, the article proposes new legislation to address the structural deficiencies
in the District's current FOIA regime.
I.

BACKGROUND ON THE DISTRICT'S FREEDOM OF INFORMATION

A.

ACT

A Brief History of the Federal FOIA

Over the course of its almost 45-year history, the Freedom of Information Act
has undergone several changes, though the basic structure remains the same since
its enactment in 1966, when Congress created a legal right of access to federal
records.13 Enshrined in the Act was the "simple but revolutionary" concept that
"[any person, citizen or non-citizen-for whatever reason, good or ill-may file
a request for an agency record, and the agency must disclose it unless the document falls within one of nine exemptions laid down in the law.' 14 If the agency
fails to disclose the record, the Act provides that a person has a right to seek
judicial relief. Despite its significance, in the few years following its enactment,
15
the law did not produce promising results.
During the fallout from the Watergate scandal, in an effort to improve the law
and to shore up public confidence in the federal government, Congress in 1974
amended the Freedom of Information Act. 16 In addition to narrowing the statutory exemptions from disclosure, the 1974 amendments responded to a key weakness of the 1966 law and significantly strengthened the enforcement mechanisms
within FOIA. The amendments established time limits in which to respond to a
request, authorized disciplinary actions against employees found to have acted
13 For an illuminating discussion about the political motivations behind the introduction and
passage of the 1966 Act and the 1974 amendments, see Martin E. Halstuk & Bill F. Chamberlin, The
Freedom of Information Act 1966-2006: A Retrospective on the Rise of Privacy Protection Over the
Public Interest in Knowing What the Government's Up To, 11 COMM. L. & POL'Y 511, 517-34 (2006).
For an excellent description of the evolution of the federal Freedom of Information Act, see Charles J.
Wichmann III, Ridding FOIA of Those "UnanticipatedConsequences": Repaving a Necessary Road to
Freedom, 47 DUKE L.J. 1213 (1998).
14 Patricia M. Wald, The Freedom of Information Act: A Short Case Study in the Perils and
Paybacks of Legislating Democratic Values, 33 EMORY L.J. 649, 655 (1984). The exemptions, which
are not relevant for the purposes of this article, can be found in 5 U.S.C. §552(b) (2008).
15 Id. (citing Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Amending the Freedom of Information Act, FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE REP. No. 24-1, at 7 (1974) ("deliberate evasion, ignorance, the

lack of incentives, personnel problems and pressures from superiors, as well as judicial caution, have
all operated at various times and in different proportions to undercut the purposes of FOIA").
16 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat.
1561. The amendments were not easy to come by. On October 17, 1974, President Ford vetoed the
amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, prompting a legislative override. For a narrative
history of the debate surrounding the 1974 amendments, see Veto Battle 30 Years Ago Set Freedom of
Information Norms, Nat'l Sec. Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 142 (Dan Lopez et al. eds., Nov.
23. 2004), available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB142/index.htm.
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"arbitrarily and capriciously" in denying a request, created reporting requirements, and established a fee structure.
Almost two decades later, in 1996, Congress enacted the Electronic Freedom
of Information Act Amendments (EFOIA Amendments).1 7 Under the EFOIA
Amendments, which were aimed at "bring[ing] FOIA into the information and
electronic age,' 8 agencies were required to provide a requester with records in a
format of the requester's choosing, to "make reasonable efforts to search for the
records in electronic form or format," and to automatically post certain information online in "electronic reading rooms."' 9 In addition, while the EFOIA
Amendments extended the time limit in which an agency had to respond to2 a0
request, it also created an "expedited review" process in certain circumstances.
Most recently, in 2007, Congress enacted the Openness Promotes Effectiveness in our National (OPEN) Government Act of 2007.2' That bill, which passed
unanimously through both houses of Congress and was signed without a statement by President George W. Bush, made several significant changes to the federal Freedom of Information Act. Among the changes were provisions that:
increased the availability of attorney fees and specified that attorney fees must be
paid by the agency directly; allowed an agency to toll the 20-day time limit; and
22
restricted the ability of an agency to collect search fees beyond the time limit.
Also key to the Act was the creation of the Office of Government Information
Services, which is discussed in greater detail in Section IV.A.5, infra.
B.

The Structure of the District of Columbia Freedom of Information Act

The structure of the District of Columbia Freedom of Information Act substantially tracks the federal model, and District courts have "treated case law
interpreting the federal FOIA as instructive authority with respect to our own
Act."2 3 Like the federal version, the District's law "was designed to 'pierce the
veil of administrative secrecy and to open agency action to the light of public
scrutiny."' 24 Indeed, the preamble of the District's Freedom of Information Act
states that "[t]he public policy of the District of Columbia is that all persons are
17 Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-231, 110 Stat.
3048.
18 President William J. Clinton, Statement upon signing the Electronic Freedom of Information
Act Amendments of 1996 (Oct. 2, 1996), availableat http://www.gwu.edul-nsarchiv/nsalfoia/president
stmt.pdf.
19 EFOIA Amendments, supra note 17, §§ 3-5.
20 EFOIA Amendments, supra note 17, § 7.
21 OPEN Government Act, Pub. L. No. 110-175, 121 Stat. 2524.
22 Id. at §§ 4, 6.
23 Wash. Post Co. v. Minority Bus. Opportunity Coim'n, 560 A.2d 517, 521 n.5 (D.C. 1989).
24 Id. at 521.
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entitled to full and complete information regarding the affairs of government and
25
the official acts of those who represent them as public officials and employees.
The operation of the District's FOIA is fairly straightforward. It provides that
public bodies 26 must provide records to individuals upon request unless a specific
exemption applies. 27 Those exemptions 2 8 are construed narrowly, but if a public
record falls within an exemption, the public body must provide "any reasonably
... after deletion of those portions which
segregable portion of a public record
'
may be withheld from disclosure. 29
The law provides that an agency has 15 business days in which to respond to a
properly submitted FOIA request, though an agency may extend the response
time by 10 business days in "unusual circumstances. 30 If an agency denies a request, it must provide a written letter of denial identifying the "specific reasons
for the denial," the name of the employee responsible for the denial, and notice
of the requester's right to appeal the decision.3"
25 D.C. CODE § 2-531 (2009). And, importantly, as part of the 2000 amendments to the DC
FOIA, the Council struck the word "Generally" from the beginning of the preamble.
26 The term "public body" refers to the "Mayor, an agency, or the Council of the District of
Columbia." D.C. CODE § 2-502(18A) (2009). Before 2000, the District of Columbia Freedom of Information Act only covered agencies.
27 D.C. CODE §2-532(a) (2009).
28 A complete list of exemptions follow: "Trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from outside the government"; "Information of a personal nature where the public
disclosure thereof would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy"; "Investigatory records compiled for law-enforcement purposes"; "Inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums
or letters"; "Test questions and answers to be used in future license, employment, or academic examinations, but not previously administered examinations or answers to questions thereon"; "Information specifically exempted from disclosure by statute"; "Information specifically authorized by federal
law under criteria established by a presidential executive order to be kept secret in the interest of
national defense or foreign policy"; "Information exempted from disclosure by § 28-4505"; "Information disclosed pursuant to § 5-417"; "Any specific response plan, including any District of Columbia
response plan, as that term is defined in § 7-2301(1), and any specific vulnerability assessment, either
of which is intended to prevent or to mitigate an act of terrorism, as that term is defined in § 223152(1)"; "Information exempt from disclosure by § 47-2851.06"; "Information, the disclosure of
which would reveal the name of an employee providing information under subchapter XV-A of
Chapter 6 of Title 1 and subchapter XII of Chapter 2 of this title, "unless the name of the employee is
already known to the public"; "Information exempt from disclosure by § 7-2271.04"; "Information
that is ordered sealed and restricted from public access pursuant to Chapter 8 of Title 16." D.C. CODE
§ 2-534(a) (2009).
29 D.C. CODE § 2-534(b) (2009).
30 D.C. CODE § 2-532(d) (2009). The term "unusual circumstances" is further defined in the
statute to refer to situations where "(1) The need to search for, collect, and appropriately examine a
voluminous amount of separate and distinct records which are demanded in a single request; or (2)
The need for consultation, which shall be conducted with all practicable speed, with another public
body having a substantial interest in the determination of the request or among 2 or more components of a public body having substantial subject-matter interest therein."
31 § 2-533(a).
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If a request is denied or if a public body fails to respond in a timely manner,
the requester may petition the Mayor for a review. 32 If the Mayor does not provide relief, the law affords the requester with a right to seek injunctive and declaratory relief in the D.C. Superior Court.33 If the34 person prevails in court, she is
entitled to receive attorney fees and other coStS.
Finally, the law provides that certain categories of records are "specifically
made public information." 35 These include the "names, salaries, titles, and dates
of employment of all employees and officers of the Mayor,"'36 and "information
in or taken from any account, voucher, or contract dealing with the receipt or
expenditure of public or other funds by public bodies." 37 In 2001, each public
body was required to post these records on its website. 38
C. The Legislative History of the D.C. FOIA

The District's history with Freedom of Information laws began, surprisingly,
by omission. In 1966, when it enacted the federal Freedom of Information Act,
Congress neglected to make the District government subject to the law due to a
"drafting oversight." 39 By the time Congress realized the oversight-the District
is a federal entity but not an agency within the executive branch-Mayor-Commissioner Walter Washington apparently persuaded Congress to allow the District to establish a local freedom of information policy. His effort to put a local
policy in place was embodied in Commissioner's Order 71-370, issued on November 2, 1971.40
1. The Commissioner's Order
Commissioner's Order 71-370 provided that, if a person made a written request for records from an agency, the agency would have 10 business days to
respond unless it had "grounds for delay," which could be that "the requested
records have not been located in the course of a routine search and additional
efforts are required to locate them" or that "the requested records require exami32
33
34
35
3h
37
38

§ 2-537(a).
Section 207(b) (D.C. Code § 2-537(b)).
§ 2-537(c).
§ 2-536(a).
§ 2-536(a)(1).
§ 2-536(a)(6).
§ 2-536(b)

39

Rep. of the Comm. on the Judiciary and Crim. Law on Bill 1-119, the D.C. Freedom of

Information Act of 1975, at 3 (Sept. 1, 1976) [hereinafter "Committee Report"]. To support this fact,
the Committee cited the testimony of Benny Kass, who served as Counsel to both the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure and the House Government Information Subcommittee during the drafting of the federal Freedom of Information Act.
40 Commissioner's Order 71-370 (Nov. 2, 1971).
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nation and evaluation.., to determine if they are exempt from disclosure. '41 As
an enforcement mechanism, the order established a Public Information Review
Board, which would "review delays and denials of information by the agencies
involved." 42 That Review Board consisted of five members, three of which were
government officials and two "public" representatives. 43 Under the scheme envisioned in the Commissioner's Order, if an agency denied a person's request for
information, the aggrieved person could appeal to the Review Board, which was
"authorized to review the facts and the rationale behind the agency action." 44
The Review Board "met only several times since its inception, '4 5 and there were
no rules regarding the timeliness of the Board's review. Also significant was the
fact that the Commissioner's Order did not provide a right to seek judicial relief
of an adverse decision by an agency.
After the District gained home rule, the Mayor (Walter Washington) issued an
order re-asserting the provisions in the Commissioner's Order. 46 Despite the reaffirmation of policy, by most accounts, compliance with the freedom of information policies was sorely lacking. According to a survey conducted by two George
Washington University students on behalf of the D.C. Public Interest Research
Group, between March 1975 and January 1976, District agencies failed to respond to 36 of 85 requests for information and responded unsatisfactorily to another 23. The situation regarding public access to information led one
Washington Star reporter to claim that "trying to extract information from [the
District's] bureaucracy [could] be more difficult than prying facts out of the Central Intelligence Agency or the Department of Defense.",48 By all accounts, the
Commissioner's Order failed to live up to expectations.4 9
2.

The Freedom of Information Act of 1976

In light of these concerns, in 1975, the newly formed Council of the District of
Columbia set out to enact a local, statutory Freedom of Information Act. Though
much of the debate on the bill focused on the scope of specific exemptions to
disclosure, the Council at the time recognized that the "most significant changes
over the Mayor's Order pertain[ed] to enforcement.",50 The primary advantage
41 Id. at § 2(a).
42 Id.at § 4(a)
43 Id.
44 Id. at § 5.
45 Committee Report, supra note 39, at 9 (citing the testimony of Mr. Martin Shaller, Secretariat
of the District, DC FOIA Hearing).
46 Mayor's Order 76-109 (May 4, 1976).
47 Committee Report, supra note 39, at 3.
48 Robert Pear, D.C.Government Stands Alone as Bastion of Secrecy, WASH. STAR, at Al (Feb.
7, 1976).
49 Committee Report, supra note 39, at 3.
50 Committee Report, supra note 39, at 9.
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over the Mayor's Order in terms of enforcement was the right to seek judicial
relief.
Exactly how a person could seek relief in the courts was itself a point of debate. As introduced, the bill provided two ways to seek relief: a person could
either petition the Corporation Counsel [now the Attorney General] to review an
agency's denial, at which point the Corporation Counsel could bring an action in
court; or, if the Corporation Counsel declined to take action, the person could
seek judicial relief directly. In the final version, the Council agreed upon an intermediate review process, allowing a person to bring an administrative appeal to
the Mayor and then seek direct relief in the courts.
Over the course of the bill's consideration, at least four review processes were
contemplated by the Committee on the Judiciary and Criminal Law as set forth in
a memorandum to Councilmember David Clarke from Peter Boyer, a law student at Georgetown University: (1) "immediate judicial review"; (2) "appeal to
head of agency involved"; (3) "appeal to corporation counsel"; and (4) "appeal to
5
independent commission." '
According to the memorandum, the first option-immediate judicial reviewhad the "chief advantage" of a shorter time frame before judicial involvement.
Boyer also suggested that the threat of direct judicial review theoretically provided an incentive for an agency to "seriously and expeditiously" review a request. Despite these advantages, Boyer noted that foregoing intermediate review
increased the possibility of unnecessary litigation for the Government and could
deter citizens from enforcing their rights due to the time and cost associated with
litigation.
The second option-an intra-agency appeal similar to the federal model-had
two distinct advantages. First, it offered opportunities for an agency and a requester to "resolve their differences, without the time and expense of litigation."
Second, it allowed an agency to maintain uniformity in the application of its
FOIA policies. Boyer argued, though, that an intra-agency review would increase
costs and burdens on both the requester and the agency involved, and practically
speaking, would be futile in many cases, particularly if "the
decision to withhold
52
information was made [on] fundamental policy grounds."
The third option-review by the Corporation Counsel-tracked a proposal by
the State Model Freedom of Information Act and was proposed in the introduced
version of the bill. Review by the Corporation Counsel held promise of avoiding
unnecessary litigation and providing an independent, centralized check on agencies' application of FOIA. The Committee rejected the proposal out of concerns
51 Memorandum from Peter Boyer, Legal Intern, The D.C. Project: Legislative Research
Center, Georgetown University Law Center, to David Clarke, Review of Options for the Proposed
D.C. Freedom of Information Act, (Apr. 12, 1976) (on file with author) [hereinafter "Boyer
Memorandum"].
52 Id.
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that placing review in the Corporation Counsel would place him in the "intolerable"'53 position of having to advise client agencies about whether to disclose information in the first instance, and then being legally obligated to both sue and
defend an agency that refuses to release information.
The final option - review by an independent commission - failed to gain much
traction in the Committee process despite several unique advantages. Like the
other options, an independent review could avoid unnecessary litigation. But, it
offered a "higher probability of an objective review" because of the commission's
independence from the executive branch. And, it was argued, the establishment
of a commission would "provide more citizen input... into the oversight of the
operation of the freedom of information law." 54 Yet these advantages were tempered by the view that "[t]here seems to be an inherent problem of inefficiency
where appeal decisions are made by a group" and by the District's poor experience with the Public Information Review Board created by the Commissioner's
Order. 55 In addition, Boyer argued that creating a commission could have significant costs without substantial reductions in litigation costs.
After weighing the advantages and disadvantages of each approach, the Committee ultimately adopted an intermediate, informal administrative appeal to the
Mayor. If an agency denied a request, a person could petition the Mayor to review the denial. If the Mayor denied the petition, or failed to take action within
10 business days, the person could seek injunctive relief in the D.C. Superior
Court. If the Mayor granted the petition, but the agency continued to withhold
the information, the person could bring suit in the D.C. Superior Court to compel
production. This approach combined the advantage of the Corporation Counsel
proposal to provide uniformity and to reduce the potential for litigation, and also
avoided the "conflict of interest" concerns with placing an administrative appeal
with the Corporation Counsel.
In addition to administrative review considerations, the Council weighed the
imposition of individual liability for violations of the FOIA. Under the initial
proposal, which paralleled a 1974 amendment to the federal FOIA, which authorized disciplinary action against an employee who acted "arbitrarily or capriciously" with respect to withholding information, Councilmember Arrington
Dixon suggested a $1,000 penalty for officials who violated of the Freedom of
Information Act. During the Committee process, though, several observers raised
concerns about the proposed penalty provision, and suggested changing the provision to extend to all employees who acted "without a reasonable basis in law"
and to create a mechanism to provide due process to an employee. The Mayor
53
Council
54
55

Comments of the American Civil Liberties Union of the National Capital Area on D.C.
Bill 1-119, A Proposed Freedom of Information Act (Jan. 28, 1976).
Boyer Memorandum, supra note 51.
Id.
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also proposed offering the flexibility of taking disciplinary action against an employee who acted in violation of the law, in lieu of a monetary penalty.
Despite these suggestions, by the time the bill made its way through the Council, the penalty provision was eliminated entirely. Later, at least one commentator
lamented the fact that the Council removed the "personal accountability" provision despite the inclusion of such a provision in a 1974 amendment to the federal
FOIA and despite the public testimony in support of such a provision by the
Mayor's representatives.56
3. The 2000 Amendments to the D.C. Freedom of Information Act
From 1976 until 2000, the Council left the Freedom of Information Act essentially untouched. Then in 2000, for the first time in more than 20 years, the Council undertook serious reform of the District Freedom of Information Act. Though
the most significant change was expanding the scope of the Freedom of Information Act to cover the Council and government contractors, there were other important changes as well. For instance, the bill incorporated provisions from the
federal EFOIA Amendments, including requirements that the District to provide
FOIA responses in the form requested, that the District "make reasonable efforts
to search for the records in electronic form or format," and that the District automatically post certain information on its website. The bill also sought to enhance
enforcement of the Freedom of Information law by creating criminal liability for
"arbitrary and capricious" violations of the FOIA, punishable by a maximum
$100 fine. Finally, the law clarified that "raill employees of the District government are responsible for compliance," and authorized the Mayor to take adverse
personnel actions for noncompliance.
D.

The "Practical"History of District'sFOIA compliance

Despite the strength of the law as written, the District does not have an especially proud history of FOIA compliance. In 2004, one local newspaper lamented
that "District government lawyers have long found ingenious ways to delay or
reject Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests-your request got lost, your
request violated personnel privacy, your request produced no relevant documents.",57 The reporter went on to note that DCPS actually denied a FOIA request because the agency had used all of its paper and that the General Counsel's
effort to personally purchase the necessary paper proved futile.58 Before that, in
1996, a Metro Desk Reporter for the Washington Post, Tracy Thompson, described working the District Government beat as "the journalistic equivalent of
56

Larry P. Ellsworth, D.C. Freedom of Information Act, 2 DIST. LAWYER 49, 51 (1978).

57

Paper Cuts, WASH. CrrY PAPER, Sept. 3, 2004, at 12.

58

Id.
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working in a coal mine." 5 9 According to Thompson, District officials regularly
used FOIA as a barrier to information, even on "mundane"6 requests and perhaps
0
in violation of the law's automatic-disclosure guarantees.
More recently, two law professors at the University of the District of Columbia
found themselves in "a case study in bureaucratic obstruction" when they attempted to obtain the District Department of Corrections (DOC) disaster-readiness plan. The professors, who hoped to draw lessons from the Hurricane Katrina
disaster, filed a FOIA request after DOC officials indicated that the disaster61
readiness information would not be made publicly available. The DOC denied
the request, claiming national security and public safety concerns, and the professors sought relief in the courts. After the court remanded the matter to the DOC
for reconsideration, the request was again denied, and the professors appealed to
the Mayor. At that point, though, the DOC's FOIA officer inadvertently emailed
a copy of disaster plans and, soon thereafter, the professors discovered that the
document was available through a simple Google Search of the District's website.
The ubiquity of the document notwithstanding, the District then filed a motion in
62
court seeking to enjoin the professors from disclosing the information publicly.
In the past few years, mounting anecdotal evidence suggested that the District's track record with FOIA left much to be desired, as described in a December 2009 public hearing of the Committee on Government Operations and the
Environment on the state of FOIA compliance. In that hearing, witnesses testified that "misinterpretation, misunderstanding, and even noncompliance have
63
prevented the full and timely release of public records" by the District and that
the Attorney General's Office routinely forced requesters to litigate even the
most basic of FOIA requests in order to get information.'
The empirical data support the argument that FOIA denials in the District are
more commonplace than before. From Fiscal Year 2005 to Fiscal Year 2009, the
number of total FOIA requests held constant between 5000 and 6000 requests
per year.65 During that same time, though, the number of denials in whole in59 Tracy Thompson, What You Don't Know About D.C.; Facts Are the First Casualty In the War
Over Information, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 1996, at Col.
60 Id.
61 Arthur Delaney, Cache and Carry, WASH. CITY PAPER, Sept. 22, 2008, available at http:I/
www.washingtoncitypaper.com/articles/36218/cache-and-carry.
62 Id.
63 D.C. Council Comm. on Gov't Operations and the Env't (Oct. 14, 2009).(testimony of
Thomas Susman, D.C. Open Government Coalition).
64 D.C. Council Comm. on Gov't Operations and the Env't (Oct. 14, 2009) (testimony of Kristopher Baumann, Chairman, D.C. Fraternal Order of Police).
65 See GOV'T OF THE DIST. OF COLUMBIA, FY 2009 DIST. OF COLUMBIA FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACr REP. (Jan. 29, 2010) available at http://os.dc.govlos/cwp/view,a,1207,q,582746.asp[hereinafter "FY09 FOIA Report"].
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creased from 169 to 664, a fourfold increase. 6 6 As a percentage, the number of
denials (including partial denials) has increased from 18% to 23%. In addition,
during the same timeframe, the number of FOIA requests that are neither
granted nor denied (i.e., withdrawn, referred, or "other") has nearly doubled.

Total
Grants, Whole
Grants, Partial
Denials, Whole
Withdrawn
Referrals
Other Disposition

FY05
5795
3450
849
169
78
164
74

FY06
4861
3070
720
115
59
175
78

FY07
5399
3527
522
572
114
307
108

FY08
5989
3977
519
671
98
199
220

FY09
5637
3615
656
664
111
200
259

Thl 1. FOIA Report Numbers for FY05-FY09.
Together, the evidence weighs in favor of a conclusion that withholding of information from the public is more commonplace today than it was in the past,
and that broader policies may be a factor. As a member of the Council, for instance, the Author has personally observed assertions of dubious claims of privileges. There is also a growing sentiment that information sharing has been
severely curtailed between the executive and the Council, and between the executive and the press. Even if there have been no formal changes in policy, though,
the very perception by the public and the media that public records are increasingly off limits has a chilling effect on efforts to obtain records. And, the perceived tightening of controls on information-sharing feeds into larger concerns
about governmental secrecy and opacity of decision-making.
The District's FOIA compliance also suffers from delays in responses. Under
District law, a public agency must respond within 15 days to a FOIA request, and
in "unusual circumstances," the agency may extend the time limit by another 10
days, for a maximum of 25 days. In FY09, though, 18 District agencies had median response times of 15 days or greater. Six agencies had median response
times of 25 days or greater, the maximum allowable under the law. The Depart66 The single biggest factor may be a change in policy within the District's Metropolitan Police
Department (MPD). In FY05 and FY06, MPD denied 21 and 3 requests, respectively. By contrast,
MPD denied 385, 497, and 527 requests in FY07, FY08, and FY09, respectively. Indeed, MPD has
developed a special level of notoriety at rejecting FOIA requests. When MPD posted a vacancy for a
FOIA Specialist, one reporter claimed that he "[could not] think of an easier job opportunity.... You
would essentially be managing a black hole--the place where FOIA requests disappear never to be
seen again." Jason Cherkis, D.C. Police Seek FOIA Officer, CITY DESK, Jan. 27, 2010. The reporter
went on to explain that "the police's FOIA operation appears to be handled by a very mean robot
who simply spits out form letter rejections." Id.
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ment of Insurance Securities and Banking and the Department of Consumer and
Regulatory Affairs both reported an astonishing 40-day median response time.6 7
The Office of Contracting and Procurement actually processed fewer timely requests than untimely requests.68
But the statistics may fail to show the whole story. First, the actual statistics of
FOIA compliance are facially unreliable. For instance, even though the Department of Mental Health reported 300 staff hours on 60 requests, with a median
response time of 24 days, the agency reported $0 in total expenditures. The Office
of Contract and Procurement, which processed 244 requests in the fiscal year,
reported zero staff hours devoted to FOIA processing.
Second, because FOIA Officers "self-report," it is likely that the FOIA reports
underreport non-compliance. For example, there may be situations where a
FOIA officer provides what she believes to be a complete response, even though
it may be incomplete or nonresponsive. In addition, without greater standardization of baseline reporting, it is hard to know the extent to which delays actually
occur.

Finally, the recorded data fail to capture other aspects of FOIA compliance.
For example, under the 2000 amendments to the DC FOIA, certain documents
are required to be automatically published on the District's website. Yet, the
FOIA report provides no quantitative or qualitative data to evaluate the extent
of compliance with this statutory directive. In at least one circumstance within the
past year, the District was found to be noncompliant with the mandatory discloPolice Department failed to post its
sure requirement when the Metropolitan
69
website.
its
on
Orders
General
II.

CAUSES OF

FOIA

NONCOMPLIANCE

There are many possible reasons for the District's failure to comply fully with
the Freedom of Information Act. Among the most significant reasons include
inadequate resources and training, misaligned incentives, and a lack of a meaningful enforcement mechanism to ensure FOIA compliance.
A.

Volume of Requests

It is widely assumed that the vast majority of the District's FOIA problems are
attributable to a lack of adequate resources to accommodate the volume of re67 Equally astonishing was the Department's assertion that, despite these data, it was "in substantial compliance with the mandates of the District of Columbia Freedom of Information Act."
Dep't of Ins. Sec. and Banking FOIA Report FY09, supra note 65, at 2.
68 The Office processed 76 requests within 15 days, 33 requests between 15 and 25 days, and
133 requests in 26 days or more.
69 Jason Cherkis, It's About Time: D.C. Police Release General Orders In Response To FOIA
Fight, WASH. CITY PAPER (Oct. 28, 2009).
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quests.7 ° On an annual basis, the District receives between 5,000 to 6,000 FOIA
requests.7' Many of those requests involve detailed searches and reviews of large
volumes of documents. According to the FY 2009 FOIA report, the District expended a total of 43,081 staff hours, an equivalent of 21 full-time employees,
devoted to processing FOIA requests. 72 This number actually underreports the
effort, as the total number of staff hours is likely much higher. Meanwhile, most
FOIA officers in the District also serve as the General Counsel within their respective agencies and have a wide range of other, pressing responsibilities.
Paradoxically, another difficulty with the District's existing framework is that
many public agencies have too few FOIA requests of the almost 6,000 FOIA
requests received per year, over 40% of those requests are directed at only 2
agencies-the D.C. Fire and Emergency Medical Services and the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department.7 3 Indeed, 35 of the District's 47 reporting agencies
receive fewer than 100 requests per year, and 10 agencies receive fewer than 10
requests per year.74 The low volume of FOIA requests can lead to improper, or
at least inconsistent, application of the FOIA laws, and a lack of sophistication
with respect to handling requests.
Moreover, the training is a major challenge for FOIA. Although the 2000
amendments to the District's FOIA require each agency to designate a FOIA
officer who has completed a minimum of 8 hours of training, there is no requirement for continuing training. And because only FOIA officers are subject to
training requirements, many District employees may be completely unaware of
their responsibilities to retain and maintain organized public records. Without
such organization-which is critical to FOIA compliance-the burden on agencies is increased.
B.

Lack of Meaningful Enforcement Mechanisms

Another major reason for noncompliance is a lack of incentives. FOIA requests are often cumbersome and involve tedious searches and reviews, and when
balanced against the other duties of office, responding to a FOIA request timely
can be a low priority.
70 Take, for instance, the Executive Office of the Mayor's "qualitative description" included in
the FOIA report: "Almost all the requests we process are requests that seek 'any and all' documents
'with regards to or related to'-type requests. This means the majority of time it takes to respond to a
request is spent sorting through literally hundreds of emails, which almost without exception takes
much longer than the time frame outlined in the FOIA law." Exec. Office of the Mayor FY09 FOIA
Report, supra note 65, at 2.
71 By contrast, the federal government receives approximately 600,000 requests per year.
72 FY09 FOIA Report, supra note 65.
73 FY09 FOIA Report, supra note 65, at 7-8.
74 Id.
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Under the current framework, if an agency denies or delays a FOIA request,
the only remedy available to requester is to file an administrative appeal and,
ultimately, to litigate the denial. Though the District's regulations place the responsibilities for conducting FOIA appeals with the Secretary of the District of
Columbia, 75 in 2004, the Mayor issued an executive order temporarily placing
76
these administrative review responsibilities with the Mayor's General Counsel.
77
After two extensions, in 2007, the Mayor issued an executive order to make the
change permanent. 78 As a practical matter, fixing administrative appeal duties
with the Mayor's General Counsel creates the inherent risk of elevating the executive's interest in suppressing potentially politically79sensitive information above
the public interest in discovering such information.
There is the risk that noncompliance can lead to litigation, but even that does
not present much of problem to agencies. In most cases, an agency can respond
once it appears that a requester is willing to pursue further action. Litigation is
relatively rare because delay and costs associated with pursuing relief in the District's courts typically make litigating a FOIA claim unrealistic. It is simply too
expensive and takes too long for anyone to meaningfully pursue his legal right to
public information. Only on rare occasions are institutional entities willing to pay
for costly and protracted FOIA litigation. In the worst case, if attorney fees are
assessed by a court, those fees are assessed against the District's general treasury
fund, not against the individual or the agency.
Compounding the problem is that there may actually be incentives not to disclose. In some circumstances, the political sensitivity of the documents may provide additional reason to delay. Similarly if the document request is perceived to
be a precursor to litigation, the FOIA officer may actually seek to frustrate access
to information that would otherwise be publicly available. There may be normative incentives and other imperatives, but almost no legal incentives to comply
beyond the remotely risk of punishment should a court find that a FOIA officer
acted in an "arbitrary and capricious" manner. This poses no trouble though, as
no one has ever been found to have met this standard.
II1.

INDEPENDENT

FOIA

REVIEW IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS

Given the District's sorry history with FOIA and recent challenges, it is hard
to argue that reform at the margins will have a lasting positive effect on increasing the level of public access to information. Rather, what is needed is a structural
75 1 D.C.M.R. § 412.2 (2008).
76 Mayor's Order 2004-205, 52 D.C. Reg. 87 (Dec. 29, 2004).
77 Mayor's Order 2005-98, 52 D.C. Reg. 8164 (Jun. 14, 2005); Mayor's Order 2005-190, 53 D.C.
Reg. 694 (Feb. 3, 2006).
78 Mayor's Order 2007-62, 54 D.C. Reg. 7788 (Mar. 6, 2007).
79 In FY 2009, the General Counsel reversed 13 of 68 (20%) of the agencies' FOIA decisions
submitted for review.
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reconfiguration of the District's FOIA framework. In order to address the current structural challenges facing the District's Freedom Information Act, I have
proposed the creation of a new agency, the Open Government Office, dedicated
to enforcing the District's FOIA law and to provide greater uniformity and sophistication to the administration of the District's public-records rules.80 Although the courts provide an important institutional check, there is a need for
additional oversight of the Freedom of Information Act. In addition, I proposed
other changes to the Freedom of Information Act, including changing the manner
in which attorney fees can be collected, and ensuring that agencies can only apply
search fees and take advantage of certain statutory exemptions if they release the
records in a timely manner. If adopted, these changes could dramatically improve
the District's FOIA compliance.
A.

Creating an Open Government Office

When evaluating what form of an independent FOIA agency, there are many
models from other jurisdictions that are instructive in understanding how a structural change could improve the District's implementation of the FOIA. This article highlights the models of Connecticut, New York, Virginia, Pennsylvania, and
the federal government, and1 then describes the proposal for an Open Govern8
ment Office in the District.
1. Connecticut
In 1975, around the same time that the District was considering its Freedom of
Information Act, Connecticut established an administrative body, the Freedom of
Information Commission, which has become a model for formal administrative
dispute resolution of public record laws. The Connecticut Freedom of Information Commission is composed of 5 members appointed by the governor with the
advice and consent of the legislature,8 2 and is responsible for reviewing alleged
FOIA violations.8 3 Each member serves a term of 4 years, and no more than 3 of
80 See, e.g., Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 946-47 (2006)
("More effective open government laws would create and vest authority in non-judicial institutions
that can develop expertise in overseeing informational disputes between members of the public and
government agencies, and that can perform more individualized inquiries into the costs and benefits
of disclosure.").
81 Other models exist, such as in Texas, where the elected Attorney General enforces the public
information laws, TEX. GOV'T CODE §552.301, but because of the unique structure of the District of
Columbia government, these models are not discussed here. For a recent, brief description of other
jurisdictions' approaches, see Joshua Harman, Oversight of State Open Records Laws-A Study of
Pennsylvania's New Right to Know Law and the Office of Open Records, 79 PA. BAR Ass'N Q. 93,
117-24 (Jul. 2008).
82

CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-205 (2001).

83

Id.
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the members may be of the same political party.84 The primary function of the
Commission is adjudicatory in nature. The Commission provides a formal channel of administrative appeal of FOIA denials.8 5 In addition to its adjudicatory
powers, though, the Commission has the authority to investigate-through use of
a subpoena-alleged violations of the FOIA. 86 It is also required to provide annual training for government employees with respect to "access to and disclosure
of computer-stored public records." 8 7 Finally, the Commission has the authority
to issue advisory opinions.
Due in part to its structure and also in part to the political climate in Connecticut, the Connecticut Freedom of Information Commission has stood out for its
political independence and commitment to accessibility of public records. 88 It
has, however, experienced difficulty with administrative delays, although "the
vast majority of cases are decided rapidly even when an agency has not been
cooperative." 89 It has a staff of 22 and an operating budget of nearly $ 2.1
million. 90
2.

New York

In stark contrast to Connecticut's formal Freedom of Information Commission, New York's Committee on Open Government has served as a model for an
informal advisory agency. The Committee on Open Government is made up of
eleven members, each serving a four-year term. 91 Of the eleven members, four
are state executive-office holders and seven public representatives.92 Moreover,
each house of legislature must select one member, and the Governor must select
one representative from local
two public representatives from the news media,
93
government, and two other public members.
Although the Committee does not have a formal adjudicatory or enforcement
role, it is required to provide advisory guidelines and opinions to agencies and
the public, and to promulgate rules and regulations with respect to implementation of the Freedom of Information Law. It is also empowered to request assistance from agencies to help it fulfill its advisory duties, and must provide an
84 Id.
85 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-206(b) (2001).
86 § 1-205(d).
87 § 1-205(e).
88 Robert Vaughn, Administrative Alternatives and the FederalFreedom of Information Act, 45
OHIO ST. L.J. 185, 198-99 (1984).
89 Id. at 199.
90 State of Connecticut Freedom of Information Commission, http://www.state.ct.us/foi/What_
WeDo.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2010).
91 Public Officers Law, art. 6, § 89
92 These officials are the lieutenant governor, the secretary of state, the commissioner of the
office of general services, and the director of the budget. § 89(1)(a)
93 Id.
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annual report recommending legislative changes to the governor and the
legislature.
According to several accounts, despite its purely advisory function, the Committee "exercises considerable influence" over FOIA implementation.94 In 2007,
despite having a staff of only three employees, the Committee responded to 4,858
telephone inquiries and prepared 572 written advisory opinions concerning the
Freedom of Information Law. 9 5 Of those opinions, the majority were provided to
members of the public. 96 Meanwhile, the Committee's website had 2.7 million
hits in 2007. 9 7

3.

Virginia

In 2000, after two years of deliberations by a Joint Subcommittee tasked with
examining the Commonwealth's Freedom of Information law, Virginia established the Virginia Freedom of Information Advisory Council to serve as a central "sunshine office" for the state. 98 The Council is composed of twelve
members, each serving a four-year term.99 The Council features a diverse membership made up of executive, legislative, media, local government, and public
citizen representatives. °° Like the New York Committee on Open Government,
it is empowered to render advisory opinions, provide training and public outreach, request assistance from agencies, and to provide an annual report recommending legislative changes. 10 1 Unlike the New York Committee, the Virginia
Freedom of Information Advisory Council is housed within the legislative
branch, as a subordinate office of the legislature's Division of Legislative Services. 10 2 According to its 2009 Annual Report, "the Council, with its staff of two,
94
95

Vaughn, supra, note 88, at 206.
NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COMMITIEE ON OPEN GOVERNMENT, REPORT TO THE

GOVERNOR AND STATE LEGISLATURE - 2008 (2008), availableat http:llwww.dos.state.ny.us/coog2008

report.html.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 REPORT OF THE JOINT SUBCOMMITTEE STUDYING VIRGINIA'S
ACT, H. Doc. No. 106 (2000); H.R. 551, 2000, Reg. Sess. (Va. 2000).
99 VA. CODE ANN. § 30-178 (2000).
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100 The membership includes: "the Attorney General or his designee; the Librarian of Virginia
or his designee; the Director of the Division of Legislative Services or his designee; four members
appointed by the Speaker of the House of Delegates, one of whom shall be a member of the House of
Delegates, and three nonlegislative citizen members, at least one of whom shall be or have been a
representative of the news media; three members appointed by the Senate Committee on Rules, one
of whom shall be a member of the Senate, one of whom shall be or have been an officer of local
government, and one nonlegislative citizen at-large member; and two nonlegislative citizen members
appointed by the Governor, one of whom shall not be a state employee." VA. CODE ANN. § 30-178(B)

(2000).
101
102

VA. CODE ANN. § 30-179 (2000).
§ 30-180.
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responded to 1,691 inquiries" and conducted 54 training seminars statewide.'
0 4
Its website had 3.2 million hits.'
4.

10 3

Pennsylvania

In 2008, as part of a significant reform effort, Pennsylvania established an Office of Open Records within the executive branch with primary responsibilities of
administering the Commonwealth's Right-to-Know Law.' 0 5 The Office of Open
Records is headed by an Executive Director, who is appointed by the Governor
and serves a six-year term. 0 6
As in New York and Virginia, the Office of Open Records is empowered to
provide advisory opinions and training to government employees and the public
and must provide an annual report of its activities and findings to the Governor
and General Assembly.1 0 7 But, unlike the agencies in other jurisdictions, the Office of Open Records is also required to provide formal review of agency deci10 8
sions and to provide an informal mediation program.
Though no formal annual report has been published at the time of this article,
the Office claimed that the nine person staff answered nearly 5,000 e-mails, telephone calls and letters, conducted more than 300 training sessions, and reviewed
1,000 cases within the first eleven months of operation.' 0 9
5.

The Federal Office of Government Information Services

As part of the federal OPEN Government Act of 2007, Congress established a
new Office of Government Information Services within the National Archives
and Records Administration."' 0 As originally conceived, the purpose of the
OGIS is to "unburden the entire system of FOIA processing by enhancing requester understanding of the FOIA process, creating uniformity among the agencies, and serving as a valuable alternative to litigation."'1 1 In addition, because
103

VIRGINIA FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ADVISORY COUNCIL,

REPORT OF THE

VIRGINIA

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ADVISORY COUNCIL TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

24 (Dec. 2009).
104 Id. at 25.
105 65 PA. STAT. ANN. § 67.101-.3104 (2009).
106 § 67.1310.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Press Release, Pa. Office of Open Records, 1000 Appeals, (Nov. 23, 2009), available at
https://www.dced.state.pa.us/public/oor/November%2023,%202009%20press%20release%20-%2010
00%20appeals.pdf.
110 5 U.S.C. § 552(h) (2010).
111 History Museum or Records Access Agency? Defining and Fulfilling the Mission of the National Archives and Records Administration Before the Information Policy, Census & Nat'l Archives
Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform, 111th Cong., (2009) (statement of Kevin
M. Goldberg, Legal Counsel, Am. Society of News Editors).
OF VIRGINIA
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the OGIS would be independent of the U.S. Department of Justice's Office of
Information Policy, which is the administration's official voice on FOIA issues,
the OGIS would be "the only entity within government that can properly serve as
the policeman that ensures agency compliance with Congressionally stated goals
12
for FOIA."''
The OGIS is empowered to provide mediation as an alternative to litigation,
review agencies' compliance with FOIA, and recommend policy changes to Congress and the President.' 1 3 Beginning in January 2010, the OGIS began publishing weekly "case logs," which provide the date that an inquiry or request is
received, the relevant agency, a description of the request, a description of the
case's status, and a completion date. According to its website, the OGIS has received 110 cases from September 2009 through March 12, 2010, and resolved 79
of those cases.11 4
6.

The Proposed Open Government Office

Central to any FOIA reform in the District should be the creation of an independent Open Government Office. The Open Government Office would be
headed by a director, appointed by the Mayor with the advice and consent of the
Council. The director would serve a five-year term and would be removable only
for cause.
The Open Government Office would provide advisory opinions and training to
agencies and to the public in a manner similar to the New York Committee on
Open Government, the Virginia Freedom of Information Council, and the Pennsylvania Office of Open Records. The availability of formal and informal advisory opinions would improve the District's ability to timely comply with requests,
and would help requesters shape better requests. Similarly, by expanding training
opportunities beyond FOIA officers, the Office could both enhance the public's
understanding of FOIA and raise awareness about residents' right to access public records.
In addition, the Office should be empowered to offer mediation services to
help resolve disputes as a nonexclusive alternative to litigation. Although there
may be good reasons for the creation of a formal Freedom of Information Commission to review FOIA denials, given the size of the District government and the
number of denials made on an annual basis, it is unwise to create a new channel
of appeal.
The use of informal mediation would, drawing upon the experience of the federal Office of Government Information Services, allow requesters and the agency
112
113
114

Id.
§ 552(h).

OFFICE OF GOV'T INFORMATION SERVICES, OFFICE OF GOV'T INFORMATION SERVICES
CASE Loo (2010) available at http://www.archives.gov/ogis/#about.
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to resolve their disputes with a credible third-party intermediary that understands
both the need for public information but also the very real burdens that agencies
face in complying with FOIA. It would also preserve the right to seek judicial
review if mediation broke down or if the Open Government Office became sufficiently delayed in reviewing denials.
Beyond the ability to act in an advisory or dispute-resolution capacity, I recommend vesting the Open Government Office with robust enforcement powers.
The ability to issue subpoenas would be an important tool toward ensuring compliance, particularly with recalcitrant agencies. In addition, given the reluctance
of the courts to enforce FOIA-related sanctions, empowering the Open Government Office with the ability to enforce the FOIA provides an important check on
potential for abuse of FOIA.
Finally, I propose that the Open Government Office be required to submit an
annual report to the Council and to the Mayor containing details about its activities during the calendar year and any policy recommendations about the Freedom of Information Act.
The creation of a nimble, credible Open Government Office has many possible
advantages. First, if the executive misapplies the law or simply refuses to release a
document, the existence of the Open Government Office increases the chance
that the public will have access to those public records without resorting to costly
litigation. Second, there is a greater probability that the Open Government Office can reduce the burden on agencies to comply with FOIA. For instance, the
Office can ensure that FOIA requests are more narrowly tailored to match a
requester's specific need.' 15 Third, by developing a level of expertise and facility
with FOIA, the Open Government Office can also provide advisory opinions to
aid agencies that infrequently deal with FOIA. Finally, the Open Government
Office can serve as an expert, impartial voice for regular reform of the FOIA.
Through regular revision-or at least revisitation-of the Freedom of Information Act, the District will be better positioned to meet the changing demands of
requesters and agencies.
B.

Align Incentives to Optimize Compliance

As discussed above, one reason that agencies fail to take FOIA seriously is the
lack of incentives to process requests in a timely manner. To address this, I propose allowing an agency to capture FOIA processing fees. In the District, FOIA
search fees are paid into the general treasury, not to the reviewing agency. Ac115 See, e.g., Advancing Freedom of Information in the New Era of Responsibility Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong., (2009) (statement of Miriam Nisbet, Dir., Office of Gov't Information Services) ("Public understanding of how government records are organized and maintained is
not strong, nor should it be required to submit a FOIA request. But that lack of understanding can
result in requests that are overly broad, or which lack the specificity to allow the agency to readily
search for the records.").
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cordingly, many agencies view FOIA costs as purely burdensome. A simple
change in the law allowing an individual agency to capture FOIA fees would
eliminate that perception. Moreover, if the law were structured in a way that
would cause the agency to "lose" the fee if the agency fails to respond in a timely
manner, that would create an obvious incentive for an agency to assiduously review FOIA requests in a timely manner.
Finally, I recommend following the lead of the federal government in amending the attorney fees provision to ensure that requesters can recover their costs if
they substantially prevailed without winning on the merits. After Buckhannon
Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources,116 which held that a plaintiff could not recover attorney fees as a "pre-

vailing party" if the plaintiff "failed to secure a judgment on the merits or a courtordered consent decree, but has nonetheless achieved the desired result because
the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct," ' 1 7 the
federal government amended the Freedom of Information Act to clarify that attorney fees would be available if litigation prompted "a voluntary or unilateral
change in position by the agency [and] if the complainant's claim is not insubstantial."" 8 Without this change, many potential litigants are at significant risk of
being unable to recover attorney fees if the Government simply provided the
requester with the documents before judicial determination could be made.
Implementing these changes would have positive effects on the timeliness of
responses. But, in order for these changes to truly work, the Open Government
Office would likely need to play a role in enforcing these provisions. For example, under these changes, there might be an incentive for an agency to simply
deny a request rather than carefully review it in order to comply with the time
limits. If the Open Government Office were to intervene and invalidate such an
action using either its mediation powers or enforcement powers, it could limit
such abuses.
C. Responses to Criticisms

Although these reforms have been tested in other jurisdictions, there will
likely be several critiques lodged against the proposal. Perhaps the chief critique
will be that creating a new agency will simply saddle the District with an additional layer of bureaucracy. This argument fails though to appreciate the benefits
that are created through uniformity of the law's implementation and through a
more realistic understanding by the public of what the FOIA actually provides.
Moreover, at some level, the critique of increased bureaucracy is more ideological than pragmatic. For instance, before joining the Supreme Court, Justice
116
117
118

532 U.S. 598 (2001).
Id.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (2001).
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Antonin Scalia once described the federal FOIA to be the "Taj Mahal of the
Doctrine of Unanticipated Consequences, the Sistine Chapel of Cost-Benefit
Analysis Ignored."" 9 Similarly, Professor Richard Pierce has argued that "the
routine failure of agencies to comply with the FOIA decisional deadlines [are]
rooted in agency resource constraints" and on unrealistic expectations of legislaThese arguments, though, reflect differences in administrative priorities
tures. 120thu,
rather than serious disagreement with the concept of the public's right to access
government documents.
The second major critique will be that the creation of an agency will be costly.
Because all legislation enacted by the Council must be "budget-neutral," the argument that reform may have costs can be especially damning. It is of course true
that the proposal will require additional funds. Fortunately, though, the experiences of other jurisdictions suggest that the actual expenditure-two to four employees may be enough-would be relatively insignificant. Moreover, at least one
commentator has indicated that advisory agencies can actually reduce the costs of
administration by avoiding needless litigation and by influencing agencies' practices to achieve savings.' 2 1
Some critics may claim that FOIA is simply too expensive even if the changes
add no additional costs. It helps though to put in perspective just how little FOIA
actually costs the District. According to a July 2009 memorandum from Attorney
General Peter Nickles, the approximate annual cost of FOIA is only $2.4 million;122 the annual operating expenditure of the District of Columbia Government is more than $10 billion. Even if the District were to triple its FOIA
investment, the overall cost of FOIA would amount to less than 1 tenth of a
percent of the District's budget.
The last major critique will be that the Director of the Open Government Office cannot maintain adequate independence from the Executive. There are two,
separate threads to this argument. First, there is a risk that the Office may be
subject to agency-capture if the Office must rely on the Executive and the Council to provide it with information. Second, if the Director is appointed by the
Mayor, there is a risk that the Mayor may have a built-in incentive to select a
"toothless watchdog."
Both threads must be taken very seriously, especially during the early stages of
implementing an Open Government Office. The first can be readily addressed.
By providing the agency with subpoena authority and a degree of budgetary independence, the Open Government Office can take steps to preserve its indepen119
120

Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of Information Act Has No Clothes, REG.,15 Mar.-Apr. 1982.
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Judicial Review ofAgency Actions in a Period of DiminishingAgency

Resources, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 61, 80 (Winter 1997).

121 Vaughn, supra, note 88, at 213.
122 Memorandum from Peter J. Nickles to the Council of the District of Columbia regarding
FOIA Expenses (Jul. 2, 2009).
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dence from the Executive and the Council. Preserving the credibility and
independence of the Office is no simple task, but it is certainly achievable.
As a practical matter, the second thread is harder to address directly. Even the
most thoughtfully designed statute cannot avoid an ineffective or uncommitted
agency head. Experience in other jurisdictions has taught that perhaps the single
greatest factor in the success in a FOIA "ombudsman" is having a strong leader.
To avoid this pitfall, the Mayor and Council will need to take deliberate steps to
ensure that the appointed Director has a deep understanding of the Freedom of
Information Act and a demonstrated commitment to openness in government. In
doing so, the Mayor and Council will need to remind themselves that having a
professional and credible arbiter of FOIA actually benefits the government by
preserving the public's confidence in the system and by providing support to the
agencies who must deal with the law on a day-to-day basis. Some of the qualifications can be mandated by law, but, of course, passion, leadership, and energy will
always remain an appointments call.
CONCLUSION

The District of Columbia has had almost three decades of experience with the
Freedom of Information Act, and almost four decades with a freedom of information policy. For almost as long, the law's implementation-like in many other
jurisdictions-has failed to live up to the law's promise. There are ways, though,
to improve implementation. By effectively using technology, realigning incentives
to encourage public disclosure, and making a strong commitment toward openness, the District can take dramatic steps forward. Moreover, creating an independent office committed to helping the public navigate FOIA bureaucracies and
to improving agencies' compliance with the public records laws can provide
greater uniformity, sophistication, and an accountable office for measuring the
system's efficacy. The Freedom of Information Act represents one of the strongest legislative commitments toward transparency in our government. To the extent that reform can reinforce that commitment and can improve the functioning
of our government, it is incumbent on the Council and the Mayor to promptly
attend to this effort. The public deserves no less.

